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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON ISSUE OF CON-
FISCATION-[United States].-The Texas Railroad Commission promulgated
a proration order for restricting the production of petroleum in the east
Texas oil bed. Each well was to be allowed to produce 2.32 percent of its
"hourly potential" except that any well was allowed to produce up to
twenty barrels a day. The result was that 451 wells were permitted
to operate at capacity, 19,032 were allowed twenty barrels a day, and
the other 6,325 wells, all capable of producing between 865 and 1100 barrels
an hozur, were forced to cut down to between twenty-two and twenty-five
barrels a day. Complainant's wells were all in the latter group. They were
all in the most desirable section and among the most valuable wells of the
oil bed. Although many tracts were more closely drilled than complainant's,
complainant was refused permission to drill more wells. Suit was brought
in the federal district court to enjoin enforcement on the ground that the
order was confiscatory and violative of due process in that it disregarded
complainant's property rights to the oil in place under its land and per-
mitted it to be drained off through neighboring tracts. The district court
granted a trial de novo and set aside the order. Held, that the federal court
should not supplant the commission's judgment even if convincing proof
were presented that a different order would be better. Railroad Commission
v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.'
The rule applied in public utility rate order cases has been that when
the rates were alleged to be confiscatory the court should make an inde-
pendent determination of all facts relevant to the issue of confiscation, espe-
cially the valuation of the property.2 This rule is based on the proposition
that rate making is a legislative act and that due process requires an
independent judicial determination of all questions of fact and law bearing
1. (1940) 310 U. S. 573. See also Railroad Comm. v. Rowan and Nichols
Oil Co. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 343, involving a subsequent order which the Su-
preme Court upheld for the same reasons.
2. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920) 253 U. S. 287;
St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38; Bluefield
Water Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1923) 262 U. S. 679. In Baltimore
and Ohio R. R. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 349, it was indicated
that this review might be not merely a consideration of the record but a
trial de novo where the court felt it desirable to receive additional evidence.
Cf. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 53 et
seq. The rule has been limited somewhat in its application by disregard
of the issue of confiscation where a "taking" of physical property is not
involved, as, for example, where a rate order limits the return for per-
sonal services. Acker v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 426. A trial
de novo of the issue of citizenship in a deportation case was had in Ng
Fung Ho v. White (1922) 259 U. S. 276, on the ground that the consti-
tutional right to liberty was at stake. Brandeis, J., who wrote the opinion,
later distinguished this ease, however, upon the ground that the habeas
corpus procedure there employed left no alternative. See his dissent in
Crowell v. Benson (1932) 285 U. S. 22, 90.
3. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (1908) 211 U. S. 210.
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upon constitutionality. 4 The result has been severely criticized. It has
been said that there is no reason for distinguishing for purposes of review
between administrative determinations of "constitutional" facts and deter-
minations of other facts upon which, concededly, the administrative findings
are final if supported by substantial evidence. 5 The point has been made
that rate making can no longer be considered a legislative process, but that
for purposes of review it is more nearly a judicial oner-that the litigant
is accorded a complete hearing on all issues of fact before the commission
and has no right to another before the court. 7 The courts, moreover, have
set aside orders because of improper administrative methods of computation
of the rates without regard to the propriety of the rates themselves and
so have failed to follow the reasoning of the Ben Avon and St. Joseph
Stockyards cases;8 for if rate making is legislative, the result and not the
method used in fixing the rates would present the justiciable issue.
Much of the criticism of the rule as to review of constitutional facts
has centered around its practical effects. Reviewing findings of fact forces
courts to duplicate the work of the commissions, to weigh evidence, and in
some cases to hear testimony.9 The voluminous records and technical nature
4. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920) 253 U. S. 287,
289; St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 51.
It has been suggested that this rule grew up when rates were established
by the legislature or a commission without a formal hearing, and review
was available solely in non-statutory proceedings without an administrative
record being brought before the court. Beutel, Valuation as a Requirement
of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1249, 1264;
Note, A Positive Suggestion for a Change in the Rate Making Process
(1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 325, 328.
5. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Illinois Central R. R. (1910) 215 U. S.
452, 470; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Union Pac. R. R. (1912) 222
U. S. 541, 547; Manufacturers Ry. v. United States (1918) 246 U. S. 457,
488. See Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 Yale
L. J. 519, 520; Freund, The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Contro-
versies (1921) 27 W. Va. L. Q. 207; Brown, The Functions of Courts and
Commissions in Public Utility Rate Regulation (1924) 38 Harv. L. Rev.
141; Brandeis, J., dissenting on this point in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v.
United States (1936) 398 U. S. 38, 76.
6. Cf. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P., & Pac. R. R. (1935) 294
U. S. 499.
7. Brown, The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public Utility
Rate Regulations (1924) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 141, 148; Beutel, Valuation as
a Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases (1930) 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 1249; Note, A Positive Suggestion for a Change in the Rate Making
Process (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 325; Brandeis, J., in St. Joseph Stockyards
Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 77.
8. Northern Pac. R. R. v. Dept. of Public Works (1925) 268 U. S. 39;
Chicago, M., & St. P. R. R. v. Public Utilities Comm. (1927) 274 U. S.
344; West v. Chesapeake and P. Tel. Co. (1935) 295 U. S. 662 (Stone, J.,
dissenting, p. 680). Contra: Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad
Comm. (1933) 289 U. S. 287.
9. Where federal courts review the work of federal agencies, an oppor-
tunity to introduce evidence on the issue of confiscation has been granted.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 349. But Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920) 253 U. S. 287, left open
the question of the procedure to be followed by state courts in reviewing
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of the evidence renders these matters impossible of adequate consideration
at the hands of the courts and delays the final effectiveness of the rates
so as seriously to cripple the entire process of regulation.10 The whole
result is to take from administrative bodies functions which they have been
created to exercise and to place in the courts functions which they have
handled only with a great deal of difficulty."
In proration order cases the issue is not valuation of property but the
effect of schemes to divide production allowances among producers over a
given oil bed. The problem is complex because of the number of interests
that must be balanced and presents questions of judgment upon which judi-
cial review can add little to administrative conclusions. 12 The instant case,
the work of state agencies. The instant case involved a federal court review-
ing a state agency; the district court granted a trial de novo and heard
additional testimony. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm. (D. C.
W. D. Tex. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 131. Whether this was necessary can be
questioned. It is a problem whether courts can be confined to facts as pre-
sented to them by an administrative agency.
10. In St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38,
six and one-half years elapsed between the time the Secretary of Agricul-
ture started his inquiry into the reasonableness of the rates and the time
the Supreme Court upheld the order. The record before the district court
contained 1,648 printed pages with 111 exhibits. The total number of
pages-briefs, exhibits, and evidence-before the Supreme Court amounted
to 3,466. Id. at 84. In the Chicago telephone rates controversy it was
eleven years between the time the order was made and the time all appeals
were decided and the order became final. The record before the district
court covered 3000 pages; that before the Supreme Court, seven large
volumes. Id. at 88. In the New York telephone rates controversy, hear-
ings began before the Public Service Commission in 1920 and lasted until
1930. Evidence introduced filled 26,417 pages; there were also 1,043 elabo-
rate exhibits, one alone filling twenty-two volumes. Evidence before the
district court on appeal filled 36,893 pages with 3,324 exhibits. Id. at 90.
Similar statistics for other cases are set forth in Beutel, Valuation as a
Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1249. See also Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47
Yale L. J. 519, 524.
11. See Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 Yale
L. J. 519, 529; Kearney, The Problem of De Novo Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Action (1939) 14 Notre Dame Lawyer 233, 235. Buchanan,
The Ohio Valley Water Company Case and the Valuation of Railroads
(1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1067, has taken a contrary view, preferring,
as he says, to put his "faith in the pupils of the school of the Supreme
Court rather than in those of the Interstate Commerce Commission." Con-
gressional reaction to the problem is illustrated by the Johnson Act (1934)
48 Stat. 775, 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 41(1), which denies to the
federal district courts jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of the order
of any state rate-making body where jurisdiction is based solely on diver-
sity of citizenship or repugnance to the Federal Constitution where the
order does not interfere with interstate commerce, "was made after reason-
able notice and hearing, and where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy"
is available in the state courts.
12. Factors which are to be taken into account in arriving at a formula
for production allowances include the area of the several producers' tracts,
the shape of the oil bed, the direction of natural migration of the oil, the
character of the soil, and the quantity of the oil under particular tracts.
The formula as evolved herein by the Commission was one based on hourly
1941]
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in refusing a complete review of the issue of confiscation, indicates a drift
away from the doctrine of the Ben Avon and St. Joseph Stockyards cases.
It appears that an independent judicial review of even "constitutional facts"
will not be granted, at least in certain cases'3-probably in those where
by balancing considerations relating to the nature of the issue involved, the
character of the administrative body, the procedure followed, the character
of the relevant evidence, and the public need for an immediate decision, the
conclusion is reached that justice will be better achieved by giving finality
to the administrative finding.24
W. B. W.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-RES JUDICATA-EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECISION
AGAINST ONE FEDERAL AGENCY ON ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS OF AN-
OTHERt-[Federal].-Petitioner, which was engaged in advertising and sell-
ing in interstate commerce a vermifuge for poultry, sought review of a
cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commission directed against
false and misleading advertising of its "Gizzard Capsules." The order was
challenged on the ground that such advertising had been held not false in
a libel proceeding brought in a federal court by the United States against
certain packages of the same product. Held: Since the underlying issue
in both actions was the same, the Federal Trade Commission was bound
by the court's decision in the previous case and could not decide that peti-
tioner's advertising was false. George H. Lee Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
m2ission.1
As ordinarily stated, the rule of res judicata is that a right, question,
or fact directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a
ground of recovery cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the
same parties or their privies, even if the second suit is for a different
cause of action.2 There is privity between officers of the same government
potential which the petitioner contended ignored several of the above fac-
tors. Cf. Ely, The Conservation of Oil (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1218.
For the background to the problem of state control see Marshall and Meyers,
The Legal Planning of Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration
(1933) 42 Yale L. J. 702.
13. The courts will, of course, still accord a review on issues of law
and of whether or not the administrative board clearly acted arbitrarily
or without substantial evidence to support it. Its procedure will also be
strictly reviewed. Morgan v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 468; Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. (1937) 301 U. S. 292; Morgan v.
United States (1938) 304 U. S. 1; West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm. (No. 1) (1935) 294 U. S. 63.
14. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in St. Joseph Stockyards Co.
v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 76; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court (1921) 35 Harv. L.
Rev. 127. Cf. Beutel, Valuation as a Requirement of Due Process of Law
in Rate Cases (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1249; Note (1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev.
325.
1. (C. C. A. 8, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 583.
2. Id. at 586; Southern Pacific R. R. v. United States (1897) 168 U. S.
1, 48; Mitchell v. First Natl Bank (1901) 180 U. S. 471, 480, 481. See
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